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Abstract: 
In this paper, we examine three famous episodes of deliberate deflation (or disinflation) in 
U.S. history, including episodes following the Civil War, World War I, and the Volcker 
disinflation of the early 1980s. These episodes were associated with widely divergent effects 
on the real economy, which we attribute both to differences in the policy actions undertaken, 
and to the transparency and credibility of the monetary authorities. We attempt to account for 
the salient features of each episode within the context of a stylized DSGE model. Our model 
simulations indicate how a more predictable policy of gradual deflation could have helped 
avoid the sharp post-WWI depression. But our analysis also suggests that the strong argument 
for gradualism under a transparent monetary regime becomes less persuasive if the monetary 
authority lacks credibility; in this case, an aggressive policy stance (as under Volcker) can 
play a useful signalling role by making a policy shift more apparent to private agents. 
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Since at least the time of David Hume (1752) in the mid-18th century, it has been recognized that
episodes of deﬂation or disinﬂation may have costly implications for the real economy, and much
attention has been devoted to assessing how policy should be conducted to reduce such costs.
The interest of prominent classical economists in these questions, including of Hume, Thornton,
and Ricardo,1 was spurred by practical policy debates about how to return to the gold standard
following episodes of pronounced wartime inﬂation. Drawing on limited empirical evidence, these
authors tried to identify factors that contributed to the real cost of deﬂation, including factors
controlled by policy. They advocated that a deﬂation should be implemented gradually, if at all;
in a similar vein a century later, Keynes (1923) and Irving Fisher (1920) discussed the dangers
of trying to quickly reverse the large runup in prices that occurred during World War I and its
aftermath.
While the modern literature has provided substantial empirical evidence to support the case
that deﬂations or disinﬂations are often quite costly (Gordon 1982 and Ball 1994), there is less
agreement about the underlying factors that may have contributed to high real costs in some
episodes, or that might explain pronounced dierences in costs across episodes. Indeed, disagree-
ment about the factors principally responsible for inﬂuencing the costs of disinﬂation helped fuel
contentious debates about the appropriate way to reduce inﬂation during the 1970s and early
1980s. Most policymakers and academics recommended a policy of gradualism, reﬂecting their
belief that the costs of disinﬂation were largely due to structural persistence in wage or price-
setting. Others recommended aggressive monetary tightening, on the grounds that the credibility
of monetary policy in the 1970s had sunk too low for gradualism to be a viable approach to
The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted
as reﬂecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated
with the Federal Reserve System. We thank Francois Velde (our discussant), Anna Schwartz and Thomas Sargent
for helpful comments and suggestions, as well as seminar participants at Columbia University, the Federal Reserve
Board, Harvard University, and at an NBER conference honoring Anna Schwartz.
1 Humphrey (2004) provides an excellent survey of the views of the leading classical economists on deﬂation and
the challenges it presented to policy.
1permanently reducing inﬂation.
In this paper, we examine three famous episodes of deliberate deﬂation or disinﬂation in U.S.
monetary history, including the post-Civil War Resumption period of 1866-79; the post World
War I deﬂation of 1920-22; and the Volcker disinﬂation of 1979-83.2 One goal of our paper is
to use these episodes to illuminate the factors that inﬂuence the costs of monetary contractions.
These episodes provide a fascinating laboratory for this analysis, insofar as they exhibit sharp
dierences in the policy actions undertaken, in the credibility and transparency of the policies,
a n di nt h eu l t i m a t ee ects on inﬂation and output. Our second objective is to evaluate the ability
of a variant of the New Keynesian model that has performed well in ﬁtting certain features of
post-war U.S. data to account for these important historical episodes.
Our paper begins by providing a historical overview of each of these episodes. As seen in
Figure 1, the 30 percent price decline that occurred during the Resumption period was stretched
out over more than a decade. We argue that the highly transparent policy objective (of returning
to the Gold Standard at the pre-war parity), the credible nature of the authorities’ commitment,
and gradual implementation of the policy helped ease disruptive eects on the real economy: in
fact, output growth averaged a robust 4-5 percent per year over the course of the decade. By
contrast, while prices also fell 25-30 percent from their peak during the deﬂation that began in
mid-1920 — as shown in Figure 3 — the price decline was accompanied by a transient but extremely
sharp decline in real activity. We interpret the large output losses as attributable to the Federal
Reserve’s abrupt departure from the expansionary policies that had prevailed until early 1920;
fortunately, because the ultimate objective of policy was clear (reducing prices enough to raise
gold reserves), the real eects were fairly transient. Finally, the Volcker disinﬂation succeeded
in reducing inﬂation from double digit rates in the late 1970s to a steady 4 percent by roughly
1983, though at the cost of a severe and prolonged recession (see Figure 4). We argue that
2 Thus, we do not consider the Great Depression in our analysis, since it does not appear to fall under the
category of a deliberate deﬂation.
2the substantial costs of this episode on the real economy reﬂected the interplay both of nominal
rigidities, and the lack of policy credibility following the unstable monetary environment of the
previous 15 years.
We next analyze some fairly novel datasets that attempt to measure policy predictability
during each of the three episodes in order to quantify the extent to which each deﬂation was
anticipated by economic agents. For the two earlier periods, we construct a proxy for price
level forecast errors by using commodity futures data and realized spot prices. While these
commodity price forecast errors provide very imperfect measures of errors in forecasting the general
price level, we believe that they provide useful characterizations of the level of policy uncertainty
during each period: in particular, the commodity price forecast errors were several times larger
in the 1920s than in the 1870s, and exhibited substantially greater persistence. This pattern
seems to strongly conﬁrm other evidence on policy predictability during each episode taken from
bond yields, contemporary narrative accounts, and informal surveys. Finally, for the Volcker
period, we utilize direct measures of survey expectations on inﬂation to construct inﬂation forecast
errors (following Erceg and Levin 2003), and show that forecast errors were large and extremely
persistent, suggesting a high degree of uncertainty about the Federal Reserve’s policy objectives.
We then examine whether a relatively standard DGSE model is capable of accounting for
these dierent episodes. The model that we employ is a slightly simpliﬁed version of the models
used by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). Thus,
our model incorporates Calvo-Yun staggered contracts to rationalize inertia in both prices and
wages, and incorporates various real rigidities including investment adjustment costs and habit
persistence in consumption. The structure of the model is identical across periods, aside from
the characterization of monetary policy. In particular, we assume that the monetary authority
targets the price level in the two earlier episodes, consistent with the authorities desire to reinstate
or support the Gold standard; by contrast, we assume that the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor-
style interest rate reaction function in the Volcker period, responding to the dierence between
3inﬂation and its target value. Moreover, we assume that agents had imperfect information about
the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target during the Volcker episode, and had to infer the underlying
target through solving a signal extraction problem.
We ﬁnd that our model performs remarkably well in accounting for each of the three episodes.
Notably, the model is able to track the sharp but transient decline in output during the 1920s, as
well as the size and persistence of the output decline under Volcker. Our ability to ﬁt the timing
of the downturn during the Volcker period represents a signiﬁcant improvement over Erceg and
Levin (2003), who found using a standard Q-theory version of capital adjustment costs that their
model implied far too rapid an output decline. More generally, we interpret the overall success
of our model in ﬁtting these disparate episodes as reﬂecting favorably on the ability of the New
Keynesian model — augmented with some of the dynamic complications suggested in the recent
literature — to ﬁt important business cycle facts. However, one important twist is our emphasis
on the role of incomplete information in accounting for the range of outcomes.
Finally, we use counterfactual simulations of our model to evaluate the consequences of alter-
native strategies for implementing a new nominal target (i.e., either a lower price level, or a lower
inﬂation rate). We ﬁnd that under a highly transparent policy regime, a new nominal target can
be achieved with with minimal fallout on the real economy, provided the implementation occurs
over a period of at least 3-4 years. In this vein, we use model simulations to show that a more
predictable policy of gradual deﬂation — as occurred in the 1870s — could have helped avoid the
sharp post-WWI downturn. However, our analysis of the Volcker period emphasizes that the
strong argument for gradualism under a transparent and credible monetary regime becomes less
persuasive if the monetary regime lacks credibility. In this lower credibility case, an aggressive
policy stance can play an important signalling role insofar as it makes a policy shift — such as a
reduction in the inﬂation target — more apparent to private agents. Because inﬂation expectations
adjust more rapidly than under a gradualist policy stance, output can rebound more quickly.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the three episodes, while Section
43 examines empirical evidence on the evolution of expectations during each episode. Section 4
outlines the model, and Section 5 describes the calibration. Section 6 matches the model to the
salient features of the three episodes, and considers counterfactual policy experiments. Section 8
concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 Post-Civil War (1866-1879)
Given the high cost of ﬁnancing the Civil War, the U.S. government suspended gold convertibility
in 1862 and issued ﬁat money ("greenbacks"). The monetary base expanded dramatically in the
subsequent two years, precipitating a sharp decline in the value of greenbacks relative to gold.
The dollar price of a standard ounce of gold rose from its o!cial price of $20.67 that had prevailed
since 1834 to over $40 by 1864 (the lower panel of Figure 1 shows an index of the greenback price
of gold relative to its o!cial price of $20.67). Despite some retracing in the late stages of the
war, the dollar price of gold remained about 50 percent above its o!cial price by the cessation of
hostilities in mid-1865.
Following the war, there was widespread support for reverting to a specie standard at the
pre-war parity. In the parlance of the period, this meant eliminating the “gold premium,” the
dierence between the market price of gold and the o!cial price. Using simple quantity theory
reasoning, policymakers regarded monetary tightening as the appropriate instrument for achieving
this objective: if the overall price level fell su!ciently, the dollar price of gold would drop, and
the gold premium eventually disappear. Accordingly, Congress passed the Contraction Act in
April 1866, with the backing of President Johnson. This act instructed the U.S. Treasury — the
eective monetary authority during that period - to retire the supply of greenbacks. Given initial
public support for a quick return to convertibility, Treasury proceeded aggressively, reducing the
monetary base about 20 percent between 1865 and 1867. However, the associated price deﬂation
caused real activity to contract signiﬁcantly, with certain sectors experiencing disproportionate
5eects (e.g., heavily leveraged farmers). Thus, Congress and President Johnson were forced
to temporarily suspend monetary tightening in the face of strong public protest (Friedman and
Schwartz, 1963, pgs. 44-45).
President Grant promised to renew the march toward resumption when he delivered his ﬁrst
inaugural in March 1869, but with the important dierence that the deﬂation would be much more
gradual. By June 1869, the president received key legislative support with the passage of the Public
Credit Act, which pledged that the Federal Government would repay its debt in specie within
ten years. The long timeframe reﬂected the new political imperative of a gradualist approach.
With further monetary contraction deemed infeasible, supporters of resumption planned to keep
the money stock roughly constant, and allow prices to fall slowly as the economy expanded.
This philosophy helped guide legislation, and in turn the U.S. Treasury’s operational procedures
for conducting monetary policy. Thus, Treasury policy kept the monetary base fairly constant
through most of the 1870s, osetting the issuance of National Bank notes with the retirement of
Greenbacks. Its ability to adhere to this policy was facilitated by the passage of the Resumption
Act in 1875, which sealed January 1, 1879 as the date of resumption of convertibility, and by the
election of the hard-money Republican candidate Rutherford Hayes in the 1876 election. As seen
in Figure 1, these policies succeeded in producing a fairly smooth and continuous decline in the
aggregate price level, and allowed the authorities to comfortably meet the January 1879 deadline
for the resumption of specie payments. Remarkably, notwithstanding the pronounced slowing in
activity following the worldwide ﬁnancial panic of 1873, real output growth was very robust over
the decade, averaging nearly 4-5 percent per year.
This strong economic growth in the face of substantial deﬂation seems to have been made
possible because of the fairly predictable nature of the price decline between the passage of the
Public Credit Act in 1869 and resumption a decade later. Two factors played an important role
in making the price decline predictable. First, the ultimate objective of restoring the gold price to
its o!cial (pre-war) level was highly credible. This served to anchor expectations about the long-
6run expected price level within a fairly narrow range, so that uncertainty about future price level
mainly reﬂected uncertainty about the path of the real value of gold (in terms of goods). Second,
it was clear after 1868 that the target of restoring convertibility would be achieved gradually. As
discussed above, there was little support in Congress for returning to the rapid pace of monetary
contraction that followed the Civil War.
Our contention that the policy of restoring gold convertibility at the o!cial pre-war price was
highly credible may seem di!cult to reconcile with the political agitation in favor of Greenbacks
that would seem a salient feature of the 1870s. But support for the Gold standard — both within
the U.S. government, and the public at large — remained extremely strong in the post-Civil War
period, so that the net eect of the political agitation was simply to graduate progress towards
convertibility. 3 This support for resumption stemmed in part from historical precedent: the
United States had been on a specie standard for almost its entire history, dating to the passage
of the Coinage Act of 1792. It also reﬂected deeply-seated views about how a specie standard
protected private property rights against unjust seizure, which was regarded as a moral and polit-
ical imperative. Finally, adhering to a specie standard was regarded as important for securing full
membership in the international community (given it was the practice in all major industrialized
countries), and for deriving the commercial beneﬁts attributed to ﬁxed exchange rates.
Overall, this analysis suggests that it is appropriate to characterize the U.S. deﬂation experience
over at least the 1869-79 period as one in which both the ﬁnal objective of policy was transparent
and credible, and which implied a fairly clear path for the overall price level. There was admittedly
some uncertainty about what the target for the dollar price of gold implied for the long-run price
level, i.e., for how much price deﬂation would ultimately have to take place. However, while
the real price of gold rose through the 1870s, it seems unlikely that this slow and steady rise
3 Indeed, the restoration of specie convertibility was supported by all three branches of government. It had
the enthusiastic backing of the three successive Republican presidents who held o!ce during the period (Johnson,
Grant, and Hayes), and, through its decisions, the indirect support of the Supreme Court. While there was less
unanimity in Congress, especially after the 1873 Panic, the debate hinged more on the appropriate speed of restoring
convertibility at the o!cial price, rather than on the ultimate goal.
7signiﬁcantly exacerbated the problem faced by private agents of making price-level forecasts to
set the terms of multiperiod contracts. Thus, private agents were able to set contracts (including
labor and ﬁnancial contracts) in an environment of fairly predictable deﬂation, which minimized
the potentially adverse consequences of deﬂation on real activity.
2.2 Post WWI (1919-1922)
The U.S. government suspended the gold standard de facto shortly after it entered World War
I and began an enormous arms build-up that fueled inﬂation. President Wilson ordered the
suspension and placed an embargo on the export of gold in order to protect the country’s stock.
In the absence of the embargo, high inﬂation likely would have triggered large outﬂows of gold:
GNP prices rose almost 40 percent while the U.S. was at war, which was equal to the cumulative
increase in prices observed in the 15 years earlier. Wartime inﬂation had its roots in an almost
20-fold increase in federal government expenditure from the time the U.S. entered the war in April
1917 to the armistice in November 1918 (see Firestone, 1960, Table X). Twenty percent of this
increase was ﬁnanced by money creation by the country’s young central bank, the Federal Reserve
System (Rocko, 2004).
When the war ended, the embargo was lifted, and Treasury and the Federal Reserve had to
negotiate monetary policy in order to protect the Gold standard.4 The Federal Reserve’s Board
of Governors included ﬁve appointees and two ex-o!cio members, the Secretary of Treasury and
the Comptroller of the Currency. This governance structure gave the Secretary of the Treasury
a disproportionate inﬂuence over monetary policy, since the ﬁve appointees to the Board were
reluctant to cross the Treasury. Faced with a 25-fold increase in gross public debt after the
War (Meltzer 2003), the Secretary refused to support an increase in discount rates despite an
acceleration in inﬂation into double digits in 1919.5 However, the Treasury’s reputation was
4 Unlike the Civil war period, in which the dollar was allowed to ﬂoat, the o!cial price of gold remained ﬁxed
during WWI. Thus, the task facing policymakers was to ensure that gold reserves were su!cient to support free
convertibility after the lifting of the embargo.
5 The System’s most potent policy instrument was the discount rate charged by the System’s Reserve Banks to
8strongly linked to the success of the gold standard. In particular, U.S. law required the Treasury
to ensure a stock of monetary gold equal to at least 40 percent of the supply of base money. By
November 1919, sizeable gold outﬂows put the legal minimum in sight, and the Treasury ﬁnally
supported Board action to raise the discount rate.
Once freed to act, the Board raised the System-wide average discount rate over 2 percentage
points between late 1919 and mid-1920 (see Figure 3). Although an eventual tightening of
policy was anticipated insofar as private agents believed that the government was committed to
defending the Gold standard, both the timing and severity of the contraction were a surprise. The
highly persistent rise in nominal rates in the face of rapidly shifting expectations about inﬂation
(i.e., towards deﬂation) represented a much tighter policy stance than agents had anticipated.
As seen in Figure 3, the aggregate price level (measured by the GNP deﬂator) plunged over 20
percent between mid-1920 and mid-1921, and commodity prices declined even more precipitously.
Real GDP nosedived over 20 percent from its late 1919 peak, and the FRB index of industrial
production fell more than 50 percent. Nevertheless, as observed by Friedman and Schwartz,
the relatively short-lived nature of the depression is as striking as its magnitude, with a robust
expansion returning output to its pre-deﬂation level by early 1922.
In comparing episodes, the post-WWI experience was similar to the 1869-1879 period insofar
as the credibility of the authorities’commitment to the Gold standard seems beyond doubt. By
the 1920s, the Gold standard was entrenched as both a national and international norm, and
even countries that had experienced much larger wartime inﬂations expected to return to gold.
The high credibility of the monetary regime ultimately served an important role in allowing the
economy to recover quickly once it was clear that prices had fallen enough. But clearly, the
major dierence between the episodes was in the Federal Reserve’s decision to implement a very
rapid deﬂation in the early 1920s, which contrasted starkly with the gradualist policy of 1869-
1879. Inﬂuential Federal Reserve policymakers including Benjamin Strong believed that it was of
its member commercial banks on short-term loans. The Reserve Banks could request an adjustment in its discount
rate, but the Board had to approve.
9foremost importance to reverse quickly most of the price level increase that had occurred since the
U.S. entry into the war; while they acknowledged this might cause a substantial output contraction,
they believed the recessionary eects would be transient and did not warrant dragging out the
deﬂation (Meltzer 2003). Thus, policymakers kept nominal interest rates at elevated levels even
as prices fell dramatically. This departure from traditional gold standard rules — which would
have prescribed cutting interest rates in the face of a massive deﬂation and sizeable gold inﬂows
— helped create a depression in activity through its eect on real interest rates.
2.3 Volcker Disinﬂation (1981-1984)
As of 1979, the Federal Reserve had been in operational control of U.S. monetary policy for about
25 years, even if it remained sensitive to the political climate. The Accord of 1951 between the
central bank and the Treasury had ceded monetary policy to the Federal Reserve. For a dozen
years after the Accord, the Federal Reserve generally maintained a low and steady inﬂation rate.
But beginning in the mid-1960s, the Federal Reserve permitted inﬂation to rise to progressively
higher levels. By the time President Carter appointed in 1979 a well-known inﬂation “hawk”,
Paul Volcker, to run the Federal Reserve, (GNP) price inﬂation had reached 9 percent.
Two months after taking o!ce in August 1979, Volcker announced a major shift in policy
aimed at rapidly lowering the inﬂation rate. Volcker desired the policy change to be interpreted as
a decisive break from past policies that had allowed the inﬂation rate to rise to double digit levels
(Figure 4). The announcement was followed by a series of sizeable hikes in the federal funds rate:
the roughly 7 percentage point rise in the nominal federal funds rate between October 1979 and
April 1980 (see Figure 4) represented the largest increase over a sixth month period in the history
of the Federal Reserve System. However, this tight monetary stance was temporarily abandoned
in mid-1980 as economic activity decelerated sharply. Reluctantly, the FOMC imposed credit
controls and let the funds rate decline — moves that the Carter Administration had publically
supported. The FOMC’s policy reversal and acquiesence to political pressure was widely viewed
10as a signal that it was not committed to achieving a sustained fall in inﬂation (Blanchard, 1984).
Having failed to convince price and wage setters that inﬂation was going to fall, and GNP prices
rose almost 10 percent in 1980.
The Federal Reserve embarked on a new round of monetary tightening in late 1980. The
federal funds rate rose to 20 percent in late December, implying an ex post real interest rate of
about 10 percent. Real ex post rates were allowed to fall only slightly from this extraordinarily high
level over the following two years. Newly-elected President Reagan’s support of Volcker’s policy
was signiﬁcant in giving the Federal Reserve the political mandate it needed to keep interest
rates elevated for a prolonged period (Feldstein 1993), and provided some shield from growing
opposition in Congress. This second and more durable round of tightening succeeded in reducing
the inﬂation rate from about 10 percent in early 1981 to about 4 percent in 1983. The cost was
a sharp and very prolonged recession, with the CBO measure of the output gap expanding to 9
percent of GDP by mid-1982 (n.b. the plot shows the output gap by rescaling relative to its 1980
level, when the CB0’s measure of the gap was already about 3 percent), and the the unemployment
rate (not shown) hovered at 10 percent until late 1983.
While policymakers in the Gold standard environment examined in the earlier episodes had
the advantage of a transparent and credible long-run nominal anchor, the Volcker disinﬂation was
conducted in a setting in which there was a high degree of uncertainty about long-run inﬂation:
as seen in Figure 4, it took many years for longer term inﬂation forecasts — such as the Blue
Chip survey of inﬂation expectations 5-10 years ahead — to converge to the low inﬂation rates
that prevailed post-1983. But notwithstanding that Federal Reserve policy during the 1970s and
early 1980s merits some criticism for a lack of transparent objectives, it seems unlikely that simple
announcements about long-run policy goals (e.g., an inﬂation target of three percent) would have
carried much weight given the poor track record of the preceding two decades. Thus, it seems
arguable that Volcker’s FOMC had little hope of harnessing inﬂation expectations in a way that
could facilitate lower inﬂation without sizeable output costs. Inﬂation had to be reduced through
11the tough medicine of keeping real interest rates persistently high, until markets gradually adjusted
their beliefs about the central bank’s underlying policy goals, and its ability to achieve them.
3 Policy Predictability: Evidence from Forecast errors
Data on expectations after the Civil War are derived from two sources. The ﬁrst is Calomiris
(1985, 1993). He shows data suggesting that agents’ forecast errors of greenback appreciation
(i.e., price deﬂation) were fairly small. The forecast of greenback appreciation is computed as the
dierence between greenback-denominated railroad bonds and a gold-denominated U.S. Treasury
bond. In Figure 2, we plot Calomiris’ data and observe that the forecast errors were quite small,
typically less than one percentage point on average.
We investigated the robustness of Calomiris’ results to the use of dierent railroad yields.
Our exercise considers two bonds from dierent major railroads that mature within two years
of the U.S. gold bond, and follows them through our sample period of 1869-78. Given the
gold-denominated Treasury bond used in Calomiris, we can compute two series of forecast errors.
The results are also summarized in Figure 2. The ﬁgure shows an average error — across time
and railroads — of about -0.5 percentage points. The average error over the same period in the
Calomiris data is about -0.2 percentage points. Interestingly, the forecast errors are fairly small
even during the latter half of the 1870s, a period of particularly large price declines.
We can reinforce our message regarding the post-Civil War deﬂation with commodity futures
data. We collected data on the longest-to-maturity futures contract that were fairly regularly
available, which consisted of either 4 or 5 month contracts on pork, corn, wheat, and lard. The
data are plotted in Figure 1 (lower right quadrant). The actual (or realized) prices are taken
from the NBER’s macro history database when available, and otherwise, from annual reports of
the Chicago Board of Trade (the futures prices were reported in The Chicago Tribune). Over
the period from 1871 through 1878, forecast errors seem relatively small, especially given the
substantial volatility in spot prices of the underlying commodities. The average absolute error
12across commodities and time was around 10 percentage points. Moreover, the errors were not
consistently negative, suggesting that agents did not repeatedly underestimate the deﬂation.
In contrast, in the post-World War I deﬂation, commodity price forecast errors turned con-
sistently negative shortly after monetary policy was tightened in early 1920, and reached 50
percentage points or higher (Figure 3). The futures data on corn and oats are from the Annual
Reports of the Chicago Board of Trade, as in Hamilton (1992). Cotton futures traded on the New
York commodity futures exchange, and their data is recorded in the Commercial and Financial
Chronicle. Figure 3 shows large negative forecast errors among all three around the same time,
namely, from May 1920 through October or November of the same year. Agents do not seem to
have anticipated the initial deﬂation after World War I, although it did not take them too long to
learn the future path of policy. The average forecast errors over the 1920-21 tightening period over
roughly three times as large as the commodity price forecast errors derived from the post-Civil
War data.
Lastly, we can contrast the forecast errors from the post-Civil War episode with the data on
observed expectations in the 1981-82 tightening. Figure 4 largely summarizes our case for the
Volcker disinﬂation. We plot professional forecasters’ one-year-ahead inﬂation expectations and
the realized level of inﬂation four quarters later. We also include in the ﬁgure data on 10-year
average inﬂation expectations. The one-year-ahead forecasts are the median projections of GNP
price inﬂation from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The long-run expectations are from the
semiannual Blue Chip survey. Both series tell the same story: agents’ forecasts were persistently
too high. Based on one-year-ahead forecasts, we ﬁnd that the average forecast error over this
period equaled -2 percentage points.
4T h e M o d e l
We utilize the same basic model to analyze each of the three historical episodes, aside from
dierences in the characterization of monetary policy. The model can be regarded as a slightly
13simpliﬁed version of the model utilized by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), and Smets
and Wouters (2003). Thus, our model incorporates nominal rigidities by assuming that labor and
product markets each exhibit monopolistic competition, and that wages and prices are determined
by staggered nominal contracts of random duration (following Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996)). We
also include various real rigidities emphasized in the recent literature, including habit persistence
in consumption, and costs of changing the rate of investment. Given that our characterization
of monetary policy diers across episodes, we defer this discussion to Section 6 (when we present
simulation results for each episode).
4.1 Firms and Price Setting
Final Goods Production As in Chari, Kehoe, and McGratten (2000), we assume that there is
a single ﬁnal output good \w that is produced using a continuum of dierentiated intermediate
goods \w(i)= The technology for transforming these intermediate goods into the ﬁnal output good
is constant returns to scale, and is of the Dixit-Stiglitz form:
\w =
Z 1
0
\w (i)
1
1+s gi
¸1+s
(1)
where s A 0.
Firms that produce the ﬁnal output good are perfectly competitive in both product and factor
markets. Thus, ﬁnal goods producers minimize the cost of producing a given quantity of the
output index \w, taking as given the price Sw (i) of each intermediate good \w(i).M o r e o v e r ,
ﬁnal goods producers sell units of the ﬁnal output good at a price Sw that is equal to the marginal
cost of production:
Sw =
Z 1
0
Sw (i)
1
s gi
¸s
(2)
It is natural to interpret Sw as the aggregate price index.
Intermediate Goods Production A continuum of intermediate goods \w(i) for i 5 [0>1] is
produced by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each of which produces a single dierentiated
14good. Each intermediate goods producer faces a demand function for its output good that varies
inversely with its output price Sw (i)> and directly with aggregate demand \w :
\w (i)=

Sw (i)
Sw
¸ (1+s)
s
\w (3)
Each intermediate goods producer utilizes capital services Nw (i) and a labor index Ow (i)
(deﬁned below) to produce its respective output good. The form of the production function is
Cobb-Douglas:
\w (i)=Nw(i)Ow(i)1 (4)
Firms face perfectly competitive factor markets for hiring capital and the labor index. Thus,
each ﬁrm chooses Nw (i) and Ow (i), taking as given both the rental price of capital UNw and the
aggregate wage index Zw (deﬁned below). Firms can costlessly adjust either factor of production.
Thus, the standard static ﬁrst-order conditions for cost minimization imply that all ﬁrms have
identical marginal cost per unit of output. By implication, aggregate marginal cost PFw can be
expressed as a function of the wage index Zw, the aggregate labor index Ow, and the aggregate
capital stock Nw, or equivalently, as the ratio of the wage index to the marginal product of labor
PSOw:
PFw =
ZwO
w
(1  )N
w
=
Zw
PSOw
(5)
We assume that the prices of the intermediate goods are determined by Calvo-Yun style stag-
gered nominal contracts. In each period, each ﬁrm f faces a constant probability, 1s,o fb e i n g
able to reoptimize its price Sw(i). The probability that any ﬁrm receives a signal to reset its price
is assumed to be independent of the time that it last reset its price. If a ﬁrm is not allowed to
optimize its price in a given period, we follow Yun (1996) by assuming that it simply adjusts its
price by the steady state rate of inﬂation  (i.e., Sw(i)=Sw1(i)). Finally, the ﬁrm’s output
is subsidized at a ﬁxed rate s (this allows us to eliminate the monopolistic competition wedge in
prices by setting s = s).
154.2 Households and Wage Setting
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive households (indexed on the unit interval),
each of which supplies a dierentiated labor service to the production sector; that is, goods-
producing ﬁrms regard each household’s labor services Qw (k), k 5 [0>1], as an imperfect substitute
for the labor services of other households. It is convenient to assume that a representative labor
aggregator (or “employment agency”) combines households’ labor hours in the same proportions
as ﬁrms would choose. Thus, the aggregator’s demand for each household’s labor is equal to the
sum of ﬁrms’ demands. The labor index Ow has the Dixit-Stiglitz form:
Ow =
Z 1
0
Qw (k)
1
1+z gk
¸1+z
(6)
where z A 0. The aggregator minimizes the cost of producing a given amount of the aggregate
labor index, taking each household’s wage rate Zw (k) as given, and then sells units of the labor
index to the production sector at their unit cost Zw:
Zw =
Z 1
0
Zw (k)
1
z gk
¸z
(7)
It is natural to interpret Zw as the aggregate wage index. The aggregator’s demand for the
labor hours of household k — or equivalently, the total demand for this household’s labor by all
goods-producing ﬁrms — is given by
Qw (k)=

Zw (k)
Zw
¸
1+z
z
Ow (8)
The utility functional of a typical member of household k is
Ew
4 X
m=0

m{
1
1  
(Fw+m (k)  yFw+m1(k))
1 + (9)
"0
1  "
(1  Qw+m (k))1" +
0
1  
μ
Pw+m (k)
Sw+m
¶1
} (10)
where the discount factor  satisﬁes 0 ??1= The dependence of the period utility function on
consumption in both the current and previous period allows for the possibility of external habit
16persistence in consumption spending (e.g., Smet and Wouters, 2003). In addition, the period
utility function depends on current leisure 1  Qw (k), and current real money balances.
Pw(k)
Sw =
Household k’s budget constraint in period w states that its expenditure on goods and net
purchases of ﬁnancial assets must equal its disposable income:
SwFw (k)+SwLw (k)+1
2#LSw
(Lw(k)Lw1(k))2
Lw1(k)
Pw+1 (k)  Pw (k)+
R
v w>w+1EG>w+1(k)  EG>w(k)
=( 1+Z)Zw (k)Qw (k)+UNwNw(k)+w (k)  Ww(k)
(11)
Thus, the household purchases the ﬁnal output good (at a price of Sw)> which it chooses
either to consume Fw (k) or invest Lw (k) in physical capital. The total cost of investment to each
household h is assumed to depend on how rapidly the household changes its rate of investment
(as well as on the purchase price). Our speciﬁcation of such investment adjustment costs as
depending on the square of the change in the household’s gross investment rate follows Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Investment in physical capital augments the household’s (end-
of-period) capital stock Nw+1(k) according to a linear transition law of the form:
Nw+1 (k)=( 1 )Nw(k)+Lw(k) (12)
In addition to accumulating physical capital, households may augment their ﬁnancial assets
through increasing their nominal money holdings (Pw+1 (k)  Pw (k))> and through the net ac-
quisition of bonds. We assume that agents can engage in frictionless trading of a complete set
of contingent claims. The term
R
v w>w+1EG>w+1(k)  EG>w(k) represents net purchases of state-
contingent domestic bonds, with w>w+1 denoting the state price, and EG>w+1 (k) the quantity of such
claims purchased at time w. Each member of household k earns labor income (1+Z)Zw (k)Qw (k)
(where Z is a subsidy that allows us to oset monopolistic distortions in wage-setting) , and
receives gross rental income of UNwNw(k) from renting its capital stock to ﬁrms. Each member
17also receives an aliquot share w (k)of the proﬁts of all ﬁrms, and pays a lump-sum tax of Ww (k)
(this may be regarded as taxes net of any transfers).
In every period w, each member of household k maximizes the utility functional (9) with respect
to its consumption, investment, (end-of-period) capital stock, money balances, and holdings of
contingent claims, subject to its labor demand function (8), budget constraint (11), and transition
equation for capital (12). Households also set nominal wages in Calvo-style staggered contracts
that are generally similar to the price contracts described above. Thus, the probability that
a household receives a signal to reoptimize its wage contract in a given period is denoted by
1  z, and as in the case of price contracts this probability is independent of the date at which
the household last reset its wage. However, we specify a dynamic indexation scheme for the
adjustment of the wages of those households that do not get a signal to reoptimize, i.e., Zw(k)=
$wZw1(k)>in contrast to the static indexing assumed for prices. As discussed by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), dynamic indexation of this form introduces some element of
structural persistence into the wage-setting process. Our asymmetric treatment is motivated
by the empirical analysis of Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005). These authors
estimated a similar model using U.S. data over the 1955:1-2001:4 period, and found evidence in
favor of nearly full indexation of wages, but not of prices (hence our speciﬁcation of prices as
purely forward-looking).
4.3 Fiscal Policy and the Aggregate Resource Constraint
The government’s budget is balanced every period, so that total lump-sum taxes plus seignorage
revenue are equal to output and labor subsidies plus the cost of government purchases:
Pw  Pw1 +
R 1
0 Ww (k)gk =
R 1
0 sSw (i)\w (i)gi +
R 1
0 zZw (k)Qw (k)gk + SwJw (13)
where Jw indicates real government purchases. We assume that government spending is a ﬁxed
share of output in our analysis. Finally, the total output of the service sector is subject to the
18following resource constraint:
\w = Fw + Lw + Jw (14)
5 Solution and Calibration
To analyze the behavior of the model, we log-linearize the model’s equations around the non-
stochastic steady state. Nominal variables, such as the contract price and wage, are rendered
stationary by suitable transformations. We then compute the reduced-form solution of the model
for a given set of parameters using the numerical algorithm of Anderson and Moore (1985), which
provides an e!cient implementation of the solution method proposed by Blanchard and Kahn
(1980).
5.1 Parameters of Private Sector Behavioral Equations
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. Thus, we assume that the discount factor
 = =995> consistent with a steady-state annualized real interest rate u of about 2 percent. We
assume that the subutility function over consumption is logarithmic, so that  =1 > while we set
the parameter determining the degree of habit persistence in consumption y = 0.6 (similar to the
empirical estimate of Smets and Wouters 2003). The parameter "> which determines the curvature
of the subutility function over leisure, is set equal to 10, implying a Frisch elasticity of labor supply
of 1/5. This is considerably lower than if preferences were logarithmic in leisure, but within the
range of most estimates from the empirical labor supply literature. The scaling parameter "0 is set
so that employment comprises one-third of the household’s time endowment, while the parameter
0 on the subutility function for real balances is set an arbitrarily low value (so that variation in
real balances has a negligible impact on other variables). The share of government spending of
total expenditure is set equal to 12 percent, while the autoregressive parameter of the government
spending shock is set close to unity (i.e., *J = 0.999 — this is simply to capture that the decline
in wartime spending following the WWI armistice was viewed as highly persistent).
The capital share parameters  =1 @3. The quarterly depreciation rate of the capital stock  =
190=02, implying an annual depreciation rate of 8 percent. The price and wage markup parameters
S = Z =1 @5. We set the cost of adjusting investment parameter !L =1 ,w h i c hi ss o m e w h a t
smaller than the value estimated by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) using a limited
information approach; however, the analysis of Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005) suggests that
a lower value in the range of unity may be better able to capture the unconditional volatility of
investment within a similar modeling framework. We assume that price contracts last three
quarters, while nominal wage contracts last four quarters. The calibration of contract duration is
in the range typically estimated in the literature.
6M o d e l S i m u l a t i o n s
6.1 The Post Civil War Deﬂation
While we will attempt to use our model to account for the evolution of real activity during the
latter two episodes — on the premise that monetary changes played a principal role in driving
the real ﬂuctuations that occurred — our objective in applying the model to the post Civil War
deﬂation is narrower in scope. In particular, while a more complicated model with a richer set of
shocks would be required to account for output behavior over the long period prior to Resumption,
our focus here is simply to rationalize why the “secular” deﬂation of 2-3 percent per year appeared
to exert little drag on output growth in the decade following the Public Credit Act of 1869.
In this vein, we characterize the monetary authorities in the 1869-1879 period as following a
simple targeting rule derived from minimizing a loss function that depends on the gap between
the price level sw and its target value s
w (which we call the price level gap), and on the output
gap jw. Under a quadratic period loss function in each of these gaps, the targeting rule is derived
by minimizing a discounted conditional loss function of the form:
Ew
4 X
m=0

m ©
(sw+m  s
w+m)2 + Jj2
w+m
ª
(15)
subject to the behavioral constraints implied by household and ﬁrm optimization from the model
20of Section 4.6
The solid blue line in Figure 5 presents our benchmark characterization of the post Civil War
deﬂation period in response to a permanent reduction in s
w of 30 percent. The weight on the
output gap in the loss function is chosen to stretch out the price decline over the course of a decade,
so that the simulated price level decline appears quite similar to the historical experience (this is
achieved by setting J = 10ˆ4 in (15)). It is evident from the ﬁgure that the large cumulative
decline in prices has little impact on real activity: in fact, output never falls more than 0.1 percent
below potential. The optimal policy achieves this sizeable price decline at minimal output cost
by relying heavily on an “expectations channel”: current price-setters are willing to lower prices
today in the expectation that future prices will be lower (and hence deﬂation does not require a
recession). A notable characteristic of the optimal policy is that it implies a persistent decline in
short-term nominal interest rates, which is consistent with the policy shift exerting little eect on
long-term real interest rates.
We believe that this simple characterization of policy captures many of the relevant features
of the historical environment following the passage of the Public Credit Act in 1869 that were
recounted in Section 2. These features included the mandate to eect a substantial reduction in
the general price level, subject to the proviso that the deﬂation would be gradual enough to avoid
a reprise of the post war monetary recession, and the ability of the authorities to commit to such
a policy. Admittedly, our characterization abstracts from some aspects of implementation that
were discussed in Section 2, including the operational procedure of controlling the monetary base.
However, taking account of such features would require signiﬁcant complications to our model,
and would seem highly unlikely to change our basic message that a very gradual and predictable
deﬂation exerts small eects on real activity under a reasonable and well-understood rule (speciﬁed
either in terms of the money stock or nominal interest rate).7
6 See Svensson (2003) and Woodford (2003) for extensive discussions of the use of targeting rules to characterize
monetary policy.
7 It is worth noting that the optimal targeting rule implies a complicated underlying interest rate reaction
21But given the neglible output losses under the ten year implementation window, it is also
natural to inquire whether the 1869-1879 price level decline could have occurred more rapidly
without signiﬁcantly exacerbating the eects on the real economy: did the authorities perhaps
become overly cautious in response to the public acrimony that followed their ﬁrst attempts to
deﬂate? This rather general question about how quickly a deﬂation can be implemented without
causing substantial fallout on the real economy has close parallel in earlier work by Taylor (1983)
and Ball (1994), but with the important dierence that the latter authors assessed how the real
costs depended on the horizon over which the inﬂation rate was changed, rather than the price
level. While these authors found that a disinﬂation could be implemented over a short horizon of
roughly two years or less with minimal output costs, our results suggest that a considerably longer
horizon is required to implement a change in the price level; the dierence reﬂects that while the
staggered contracts framework implies little endogenous persistence in the inﬂation rate — so that
it is relatively easy for inﬂation to jump — it implies considerably more price level persistence.
Under our baseline calibration, the implied tradeo between a shorter horizon for implementing
the disinﬂation and higher output losses can be derived by varying the relative weight on the
output gap (J) in the targeting rule (15). Two alternative cases are shown in Figure 5. The
dashed green line shows that a value of J which causes the 30 percent price decline to occur over
only four years causes the output loss to rise to about 1 percent, which still seems quite modest.
However, while our benchmark model allows an inﬂation target to be reduced over a narrow 2 year
window with minimal output losses (as veriﬁed below, consistent with the earlier literature cited),
implementing a new price level target over such an abbreviated time frame causes a pronounced
recession (as depicted by the red dash-dotted line).
These results suggest that the ten year window for phasing in the deﬂation might have been
reduced considerably without much of an adverse eect on output. Moreover, to the extent
function (see Woodford and Gianonni 2005). But at least for our baseline case of a very slow deﬂation, the
targeting rule can be approximated fairly well by a simple instrument rule in which the ex post real interest rate
responds to the price level gap and output gap.
22that wages and prices may have been somewhat more ﬂexible in this episode than implied by our
benchmark calibration, the output losses associated with shortening the implementation horizon
would be mitigated relative to those indicated in Figure 5. Nevertheless, provided there is some
sluggishness in prices and wages — even if less than embedded in our benchmark — real interest
rates must rise sharply to implement a discrete downward shift in the price level over a short
horizon. Thus, it is arguable that a short implementation window in the neighborhood of a year
or two might have risked a substantial recession.
6.2 The Post World War I Deﬂation
We now turn to using our model to characterize the severe monetary recession that began in 1920.
As discussed above, the salient feature was a precipitous and largely unexpected decline in the
price level of roughly 25 percent over a period of less than two years, and sharp but short-lived
contraction in activity. Our model simulations in Figure 5 suggest that attempting to achieve a
new price level objective so quickly would precipitate a severe recession even under a well-designed
policy derived in an optimization-based setting. But given that monetary policy seemed far from
optimal during the 1920s, it remains of interest to assess the implications of a large shift in the
price level target under an alternative monetary rule that may better account for the nature of
policy.
Despite obvious di!culties in characterizing policy during this turbulent period, we believe
that many of the prominent features of the policymaking framework can be summarized in a
simple instrument rule of the form:
lw = llw1 + S(sw  s
w) (16)
This rule posits the nominal interest rate lw as responding to the price level gap (sw s
w),a sw e l l
as to its own lag (a constant term is suppressed for simplicity). This speciﬁcation has two salient
features. First, policy rates are driven exclusively by the dierence between the current price
23level and its target s
w= This speciﬁcation is intended to capture the belief of key Federal Reserve
policymakers that continued adherence to the Gold standard hinged on rolling back the rise in the
U.S. price level that had occurred following the U.S. entry into the war. While it was recognized
that real activity might suer in the short-run, it was regarded of paramount importance to reduce
prices enough to faciliate an adequate buildup of gold reserves. The second key feature of (16) is
that nominal rates do not respond to inﬂation (either ex post or ex ante). As shown below, this
helps account for the empirical observation that nominal rates remained high despite an enormous
decline in the price level in 1920-21. This feature of the instrument rule evidently contrasts
with the behavior of nominal rates under the optimal rule shown in Figure 5, in which declining
inﬂation exerts sizeable downward pressure on nominal rates.
We attempt to account for this historical episode through a model simulation in which the
price level target s
w is reduced by 25 percent beginning in 1920:1. Private agents are assumed to
observe the underlying price level target, which we interpret as consistent with the high credibility
of the authorities’ policy to support the Gold standard through monetary tightening. The price
level target is assumed to follow an exogenous random walk, so that any shift in the target is
perceived as permanent. We assume that the shock is phased-in equally over three quarters, in
part to match the modest persistence suggested by the commodity price forecast errors discussed
in Section 3 (however, this phasing-in has been minor consequences for our results). Finally, we
set l = =5 to allow for a bit of interest rate smoothing, and S = =04 in order to allow our model
to do reasonably well in matching the rise in nominal interest rates that occurred in the historical
episode.
Simulation results for our benchmark case are shown by the solid blue lines in Figure 6. The
model evidently accounts quite well for the observed sharp fall in the price level beginning in mid-
1920. From a speciﬁcation standpoint, the dramatic price decline would be di!cult to rationalize
in a model that incorporated signiﬁcant structural persistence into the price-setting process; in
our framework, relatively short-lived (three quarter) non-indexed Calvo contracts provide a better
24account of the rapid price decline than would price contracts allowing for dynamic indexation.
The model also does quite well in accounting for the large output decline observed, and for the
rapid recovery in 1921. The output decline in our model simulation is attributable to a sizeable
and fairly persistent rise in the real interest rate. The substantial rise in real long-term interest
rates despite little movement in the nominal interest rate reﬂects both that agents came to expect
large price declines, and that policy would maintain high nominal rates even in a deﬂationary
environment.
Thus, our simulation results suggest that the high costs of the 1920-21 deﬂation reﬂect that
the Federal Reserve attempted to engineer an extremely rapid deﬂation, and that it was perceived
as following a monetary policy stance in which future nominal rates were expected to remain
high (at least for a few quarters) in the face of deﬂation: in eect, consistent with our historical
analysis, the Federal Reserve used the blunt instrument of a severe recession to push down prices,
rather than operating through an expectations channel. Accordingly, it is of interest to consider
the counterfactual simulation depicted by the dotted green lines, which shows a case in which the
central bank is assumed to change its target path level incrementally, and to follow a rule in which
the nominal interest rate also responds to ex post inﬂation (but is otherwise identical to equation
(16)). Clearly, while allowing for nominal rates to decline with inﬂation would have induced a
more gradual convergence in prices to target, it would have greatly ameliorated the output costs.
Obviously, even more favorable outcomes could be derived to the extent that policy could better
approximate the optimal targeting rules discussed in the previous section rather than a simple ad
hoc instrument rule.
6.3 The Volcker Disinﬂation
A striking feature of the Volcker disinﬂation period was the fact that inﬂation forecast errors
were extremely persistent. Erceg and Levin (2003) argued that the persistence in the forecast
errors — and associated high persistence in realized inﬂation — may have reﬂected a high level of
25uncertainty about the central bank’s inﬂation target.8 In this paper, we take a similar stylized
approach to characterizing uncertainty about the inﬂation target of the central bank by assuming
that agents cannot dierentiate permanent shocks to the inﬂation target from transient shocks to
the monetary policy reaction function.
In particular, agents perceive the central bank’s reaction function to have the same basic form
as equation (15)except that it also includes a random policy shock htw :
lw = llw1 +( 1 l)(u + w)+(w  
w)+| ln(|w @| w4)+htw (17)
We assume that agents cannot directly observe the long-run inﬂation target 
w> or the monetary
shock htw; but given that agents observe interest rates, inﬂation, and output growth (as well as all
of the structural parameters of the model), they can infer a composite shock !w which is a hybrid
of the inﬂation target and the random policy innovation:
!w = J
w + htw (18)
The unobserved components in turn are perceived to follow a ﬁrst-order vector autoregression:
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The inﬂation target 
w is highly persistent, and has an autoregressive root s arbitrarily close to
unity. For simplicity, we assume that the random policy shock htw is white noise (so t =0 ) .T h e
innovations associated with each shock, %sw and %tw, are mutually uncorrelated with unit variance.
Given this linear structure, we assume that agents use the Kalman ﬁlter to make optimal
projections about the unobserved inﬂation target 
w= The inﬂation target perceived by agents
evolves according to a ﬁrst order autoregression. Agents update their their assessment of the
8 These authors argued that inﬂation persistence was not structural, but due to uncertainty about the conduct
of monetary policy. Cogley and Sargent (2001) present econometric evidence that inﬂation persistence is regime-
dependent using a time-varying coe!cients model.
26inﬂation target by the product of the forecast error innovation and a constant coe!cient. This
coe!cient, which is proportional to the Kalman gain, is expressed as a function of the signal-
to-noise ratio (
y1
y2)= Clearly, the signal-to-noise ratio depends on the relative magnitude of
innovations to each of the components of the observed shock !w; b u ti m p o r t a n t l y ,i ta l s od e p e n d s
directly on the weight  on the inﬂation target in the central bank’s reaction function. Intuitively,
if policy is aggressive in reacting to the inﬂation gap, agents will attribute more of any unexplained
rise in interest rates (i.e., relative to a rule with a constant inﬂation target) to a reduction in the
central bank’s long-run inﬂation target.
As argued by Erceg and Levin (2003) in the context of a somewhat simpler dynamic model,
the signal-to-noise ratio plays a crucial role in aecting model responses to a shock to the inﬂation
target. Following their approach, we estimate this composite parameter (i.e., y1
y2> using the
estimated value of ) by choosing the value that minimizes the dierence between historical
four quarter-ahead expected inﬂation (taken from survey data) and the corresponding expected
inﬂation path implied by our model. In particular, we minimize the loss function:
Orvv =
20 X
m=0
£
Ew+m(4
w+3+m(vxuyh| gdwd)-Ew+m(4
w+3+m(modho)
¤2
(20)
The estimation period is 1980:4-1985:4 (21 quarters). The model expectation in (20) is the
expected rate of four-quarter inﬂation that agents project at each date, given an assumed one-
time shift in the inﬂation target of six percentage points that occurs in 1980:4. Our estimation
routine yields a point estimate of (y2
y1) that implies a coe!cient on the forecast error innovation
in equation (??) of about 0.09. This value is broadly similar to the 0.13 derived in the earlier
Erceg-Levin analysis that utilized four quarter Taylor contracts.
Figure 7 shows the eects of a six percentage point immediate reduction in the Federal Reserve’s
inﬂation target in our benchmark model. The learning problem about the inﬂation target plays
a critical role in allowing our model to account the main features of the Volker disinﬂation episode
discussed above, including sluggish inﬂation adjustment, a persistently negative output gap, and
27an initial rise in the nominal interest rate. Inﬂation declines in roughly exponential fashion,
with about 50 percent of the eventual 6 percentage point fall occurring after four quarters, and
virtually all of it after ten quarters. Our model’s predicted path for inﬂation is very similar to
that observed during the actual episode. Moreover, long-run expected inﬂation in our model (see
the lower right panel) declines much more slowly than current inﬂation, which is also consistent
with the historical experience. This pattern in our simulation reﬂects that long-run inﬂation is
largely determined by expectations about the future course of the inﬂation target, which evolve
very slowly, while short-run inﬂation can drop more quickly in response to the depressed state of
real activity.
Our model does remarkably well in accounting for both the magnitude of the output decline
and its timing. As seen in the upper left panel, the maximum GDP contraction of around 5-
1/2 percent is very similar to the decline in the OECD’s measure of the output gap shown in
Figure 4; in both cases, the peak decline occurs about six quarters after the initial shock. Our
model’s ability to capture the timing of the Volcker recession provides support for specifying
adjustment costs as dependent on the change in investment, rather than following a traditional Q-
theory approach in which adjustment costs depend on the change in capital stock 9 By contrast,
Erceg and Levin (2003) utilized a Q-theory speciﬁcation, and found that investment dropped
precipitously following the initial rise in interest rates, so that the peak decline in both output
and the expenditure components occurred roughly one quarter after the shock.
We also ﬁnd that the ability of our model to account for the Volcker period is enhanced by
allowing for the dynamic indexation of wage contracts. In the absence of dynamic wage indexation,
real long-term interest rates exhibit a smaller and less persistent increase, and hence our model
cannot account for nearly as large an output decline as occurred during the Volcker disinﬂation. On
the other hand, once dynamic wage indexation is included, the ﬁt of the model tends to deteriorate
9 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) argued that such a speciﬁcation provides a much better account
of investment dynamics in response to a monetary policy shock.
28on certain key dimensions if dynamic price indexation is also included. In particular, while our
benchmark model does quite well in accounting for the more rapid decline in current inﬂation than
expected inﬂation that characterized the latter stages of the Volcker episode (comparing Figure 8
and 4), this pattern is not captured as well when allowing for dynamic price indexation. With
this form of structural persistence in the inﬂation rate, our model simulations imply that current
inﬂation falls too slowly, and takes too long to converge to its long-term level.
Our model can be applied to evaluate some of the criticism levelled at Volcker’s policies.
Volcker was subject to vociferous criticism for the rapid pace of the disinﬂation, and the highly
aggressive policy stance required to support it. One might infer from our analysis of Federal
Reserve policy in the 1920s that there are strong grounds for criticizing the Volcker disinﬂation
along the same lines, and that some of the high output and employment costs might have been
avoided with a more gradualist course.
This critique would seem fairly persuasive if Volcker were acting in a policy environment in
which Federal Reserve policies were regarded as highly credible, and if social welfare put a large
enough weight on output gap variability relative to deviations in inﬂation from its long-run target.
If policies were highly credible and transparent, allowing for a more gradual convergence of inﬂation
to target might have greatly reduced the output costs, without excessively prolonging the duration
of the disinﬂation. To illustrate this, Figure 8 begins by reconsidering the same-sized shock to the
inﬂation target of six percentage points using our benchmark calibration (including the estimated
policy rule), except that we allow agents to perfectly observe the shock to the inﬂation target

w= As might be expected, the cost of the episode is reduced under this alternative information
structure, which we interpret as approximating the case of a highly credible and transparent
policy environment. In particular, inﬂation converges to target much more rapidly — in about a
year - while the decline in output is much less persistent than under our benchmark calibration
with imperfect information. Nevertheless, a policymaker placing a high enough weight on the
output gap relative to inﬂation might view such an outcome as unnecessarily costly. Accordingly,
29the ﬁgure also depicts some other feasible choices that would be open to the policymaker in
such a complete information environment. These alternatives are derived through placing a
smaller weight on inﬂation — and correspondingly, higher weight on output growth — than in our
benchmark calibration, though similar results could be obtained through the familiar analytical
device of minimizing a quadratic loss function that depends on the variability of inﬂation and the
output gap (as in Woodford 2003). Clearly, with a low enough relative weight on the inﬂation
gap, the fall in output induced by the inﬂation target shock would be minimal, while inﬂation
would still converge virtually to baseline in within 3 years, as seen by the red dash-dotted line; and
even allowing inﬂation to fall a bit more slowly than under the benchmark rule would noticeably
reduce the output costs, as seen by the green dashed line. Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that
a more gradualist course would have been preferable for a policymaker mainly concerned with
the output costs of disinﬂation (captured in spirit through the widespread use of measures such
as the sacriﬁce ratio), provided that the policymaker operated in an environment reasonably close
to the complete information world considered in the ﬁgure.
However, this argument in favor of a gradualist policy seems less persuasive in an environment
similar to that faced by Volcker. Our benchmark model with imperfect information appears
suited to examining some of the beneﬁts that might be derived from an aggressive policy stance
that accrue through a signalling channel. As seen in equation (??), a given-sized change in the
inﬂation target induces a sharper rise in interest rates if  is large: thus, in an environment where
agents must infer policy actions rather than observe them directly, an aggressive policy stance can
help them disentangle policy shifts from “discretionary” departures from the perceived policy rule.
In this vein, Figure 9 compares the implications of our benchmark policy rule to two alternative
rules that place a smaller weight on the inﬂation gap. We model the signalling value associated
with an aggressive policy response by assuming that the innovations 1 and 2 of the observable
!w are constant in our experiments, which has the eect of reducing the Kalman gain coe!cient
in equation (??)a s falls. Thus, the Kalman gain coe!cient falls from 0.09 in our benchmark
30to 0.05 in the alternative with a coe!cient of  = 0.40 on the inﬂation target in the monetary
rule, and to only 0.03 when the inﬂation target coe!cient declines to  = 0.20.
Considering the same six percentage point shock to the inﬂation target, it is evident in the
lower right panel that long-term expected inﬂation declines much more gradually for lower values of
= Thus, while long-run expected inﬂation eventually falls to around 4 percent in our benchmark
simulation by the end of the 1980s, it remains entrenched at 6 percent in the alternative with the
lowest signal-to-noise ratio (the red dashed-dotted line). Unsurprisingly, output exhibits a smaller
short-run contraction under the alternative policy rules relative to our benchmark, reﬂecting less
pronounced increases in short-term real interest rates. This accounts for the smaller rises in real
long-term rates shown in the ﬁgure. But importantly, because private agents learn more slowly
about the new inﬂation target under the alternatives, output shows a less rapid recovery in these
cases than under the benchmark; the divergence in the medium term response of employment
(not shown) is even larger (since the recovery in output under the benchmark is muted by the
relatively sharp fall in the capital stock).
Thus, while the less aggressive rules succeed in reducing the severity of the initial output
downturn relative to our benchmark “Volcker disinﬂation" calibration, they also lead to a some-
what more protracted recession, and markedly prolong the period over which inﬂation remains
above target. Thus, even if gradualism might seem highly attractive under policy credibility
for a wide range of policymaker preferences (provided preferences aren’t tilted toward reducing
inﬂation at all cost), a much more aggressive response might be warranted in cases of low policy
credibility.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have examined three famous episodes of deﬂation (or disinﬂation) in U.S. his-
tory, including episodes following the Civil War, World War I, and the Volcker disinﬂation of
the early 1980s. Our model simulations suggest that the relatively robust output growth that
31occurred during the post-Civil war deﬂation of the 1870s was facilitated by the highly predictable
nature of the price decline. By analogy, a more predictable policy of gradual deﬂation could
have helped avoid the sharp post-WWI downturn. However, our analysis of the Volcker period
emphasizes that the strong argument for gradualism that is apparent under a transparent and
credible monetary regime becomes less persuasive if the monetary regime lacks credibility: in the
latter case, gradualism may simply serve to prolong the suering associated with a disinﬂationary
episode. Thus, securing the beneﬁts of gradualism requires a supporting institutional framework
and communication strategy that allows the private sector to make reliable inferences about the
course of policy.
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